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1. Introduction 
77 
This article examines certain nominal uses of a because of phrase, as 
exemplified in (1), and aims to present a preliminary discussion of a role of analogy 
in construction grammar theory. 
(1) I mean, what happened is Pete Wilson signed a bill. It was a bad 
bill. .. I mean, just because of Pete Wilson's dumb mistake doesn't 
mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan. 
(CNN transcri pts) 
The underlined sentence in (1), in essence, conveys the same meaning as sentence 
(2): 
(2) Just because Pete Wilson made a dumb mistake doesn't mean you're 
going to have lights out in Manhattan. 
That is, these sentences have the meaning of inference denial (i.e., the conclusion 
that you are going to have lights out in Manhattan is not automatically drawn from 
the premise that Pete Wilson made a dumb mistake). They differ from each other, 
however, in their syntactic forms. That is, the subject of sentence (I) is a because 
of phrase, while that of sentence (2) is a because-clause. I I will call a 
form-meaning pairing like (l) the just because of X doesn't mean Y (JBo-X DM- Y) 
construction, and one like (2) the just because X doesn 'f mean Y (JB-X DM-Y) 
construction, respectively. 
Before starting the analysis, it should be noted that the JBo-X DM-Y 
construction is considered not perfectly acceptable, \vhile the JB-X DM- Y 
• The present article is based on the paper read at the Fifth International Conference on 
Construction Grammar held at University of Texas, Austin on September 27, 2008. I thank the 
audience for their helpful comments on my paper. My gratitude also goes to Yukio Hirose and 
Patrick Farrell for their comments on earlier versions. Any remaining errors and shortcomings 
are mine alone. This research is supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (Grant 
number: 22720192) from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. 
I Although it is controversial whether the JUS! because in sentence (2) is a subject (Hirose 
(1991» or an adjunct (Bender and KatllOl (200 I », I am not concerned with this issue. For the 
sake of simplicity, I use the term "subject" to refer to the position preceding the negated verb 
phrase dues17 '/ men; but for neutrality, I use Bender and Kathol's terms, the J8-X DM-Y 
construction, rather than Hirose's subject hecause-clause constructioll. 
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construction is fully acceptable (cf. Matsuyama (2001». In part for this reason, 
little attention has been paid to the JBo-X DM-Y construction while the JB-X 
DM-Y construction has been analyzed in depth in the literature (e.g. Hirose (1991, 
1999), Bender and Kathol (2001), Matsuyama (2001), Hilpert (2005». As far as 
my knowledge goes, only Matsuyama (2001) mentions this construction, saying that 
the construction is ungrammatical. In contrast to his observation, however, a lot of 
attested examples do exist (particularly in spoken registers). With a number of 
actual sentences, I argue for the existence of this construction. 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, I will review Matsuyama' s 
(2001) generative approach to the JB-X DM-Y and JBo-X DM-Y constructions, 
which rules the latter out. In section 3, I will review Hirose's (1999) 
constructional analysis of the JB-X DM-Y construction and point out some 
problems with his analysis. In section 4, slightly modifYing Hirose's analysis, I 
will propose a revised constructional analysis of the J8-X DM-Y construction, 
based on which I will explain in section 5 how the JBo-X DM-Y construction comes 
into use. In section 6, I will make a brief and speculative discussion about the 
instability of the JBo-X DM-Y construction, and lastly in section 7, I will conclude 
the article. 
2. Matsuyama (2001): *JBo-X DM-Y 
Matsuyama (2001) presents a minimalist approach to the JB-X DM-Y 
construction, which predicts the JBo-X DM- Y construction to be ungrammatical and 
in fact he rules out the construction. In this section, I review his analysis, focusing 
on how he rules out the JBo-X DM-Y construction. 
Matsuyama argues that the JB-X DM-Y construction has a subject 
because-clause merged in [Spec, T] and a null subject, i.e. pro, in [Spec, v] whose 
~-features delete the uninterpretable ~-features of T. Specifically, as shown in (3) 
below, pro merges in [Spec, v], where T deletes its ~-features against the ~-fcaturcs 
of pro and its Case is deleted. After the subject because-clause, which bears [N-] 
feature, merges in [Spec, T], T deletes its strong EPP feature against the [N-] feature 
of the subject because-clause.2 
(3) [TP [just because I'm here now]j T-doesn't [vpproj mean that I didn't 
{N} {fbW,,} {" GA&lS} 
go]] 
(Matsuyama (2001 :344» 
2 For details as to why a because-clause, an adverbial clause, has an [N-] feature \vhen it 
appears in the subject position and how pro is I icensed, see Matsuyama (200 I). 
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In (3), all the uninterpretable features are deleted and the derivation converges. 
Matsuyama also argues that the because of is a compound preposition. This 
category status is established by William's (1981) righthand head rule, which 
requires the righthand head of a compound to determine its syntactic category (cf. 
also Emonds (1985)). That is, the righthand head of because of is the preposition 
oj~ and therefore must itsel f become the syntactic category of because of, and hence 
because oj; a preposition, does not have an [N-] feature. Following Rizzi (1986), 
Matsuyama (2001:343) formalizes the relation between pro and its binder as 
follows: The binder and bindee must agree in categorial feature values. Given 
that the because of phrase is a PP, it cannot bind the pro in [Spec, v], since pro is 
non1inal and therefore has a different category feature from its binder. 
Matsuyama thus claims that the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not grammatical 
based on his analysis of the licensing system of the subject because-clause. In 
contrast to his observation, however, as example (1), repeated here as (4), shows, 
JBo-X DM-Y constructions do exist. 
(4) I mean, what happened is Pete Wilson signed a bill. It was a bad 
bilL .. I mean, just because of Pete Wilson's dumb mistake doesn't 
mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan. (= (1)) 
In order to solve the paradox, I will propose a construction grammar analysis in 
section 5. Before that, in the follo\ving section, I will observe Hirose's (1999) 
constructional analysis of the J8-X DM-Y construction on the basis of which my 
proposal will be made in the sections that follow. 
3. Hirose (1999) 
3.1 Hirose (1999): inheritance Relations 
Hirose (1999) presents a construction grammar analysis of the J8-X DM-Y 
construction and describes inheritance relations (cf. Goldberg (1995)) between the 
relevant constructions. Hirose (1999), like Matsuyama (2001), considers the 
because-clause of the J8-X DM-Y construction as the subject of a sentence, and 
points out that the occurrence of a because-clause, an adverbial clause, in the 
subject position cannot be explained compositionally for the following reasons. 
First, unlike that-clauses, because-clauses can occur in the subject position only 
when the verb of inference (and a limited range of other verbs) that follovvs is 
negated. 3 Consider the follo\ving: 
~ See Hirose (1999) and Bender and Kathol (200 I) for details of the kind of verbs that may 
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(5) a. 
b. 
{That/(Just) because} John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy. 
{That/*(Just) because} John IS liked by all the students means 
that he is a good teacher. 
(Hirose (1999:598)) 
In (5a), either the that-clause or the because-clause can be the subject of the negated 
verb of inference. By contrast, example (5b) shows that only that-clauses may be 
used as the subject if the verb is not negated. Based on the contrast, Hirose argues 
that the occurrence of the subject because-clause cannot be attributed to the 
semantics of the verb, i.e., we cannot say that verbs of inference can take a 
because-clause as its subject, since the polarity of a sentence is independent of the 
lexical semantics of the verb used in the sentence. 
Another reason is that not only verbs of inference but also make (a causative 
verb) and be (a copula verb) may follow the subject because-clause as shown til 
(6):4 
(6) a. Just because you donate a sperm and an egg doesn't make you a 
parent. 
b. Just because U.S. taxes are lower is no reason to increase them. 
(Hirose (1999:598)) 
Once again, the occurrence of a because-clause in the subject position, I-Erose 
argues, is not predictable from the lexical meanings of such verbs. 
For these reasons, Hirose refuses a lexical semantic approach to the 
construction at issue and takes a constructional approach, claiming that the JB-X 
DM-Y construction and SOlne of its variants with verbs of different kinds (e.g. (6a, 
b)) inherit their information from more general constructions. The notion of 
inheritance is proposed by Goldberg (1995). She puts it, "by postulating 
abstraction hierarchies in which lower levels inherit information from higher levels, 
information is stored et11ciently and made easily modifiable (Goldberg (1995 :72))." 
Several types of inheritance links are proposed according to how the inheritance is 
motivated, among which instance links (II-links), metaphorical extension links 
appear in this construction. 
4 Hirose (1999) refers to each construction as "the causative verb version of subject 
because-clause construction (e.g. (6a))," and "the be verb version of subject because-clause 
construction (e.g. (6b))." For a simplicity reason, as far as such a distinction is not necessary, J 
do not distinguish these types and I will treat all the types equally as the J8-X DM-Y construction 
regardless of types of the verbs used in the construction. 
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(IM-links), and subpart links CIs-links) are relevant for the present discussion. 
Their definitions are given in (7a-c): 
(7) a. 
b. 
Instance links are posited when a particular construction is a 
special case of another construction. (Goldberg (1995 :79» 
Metaphorical extension links are posited when two constructions 
are found to be related by a metaphorical mapping. 
(adapted from Goldberg (1995 :81» 
c. A subpart link is posited when one construction is a proper 
subpart of another construction. (Goldberg (1995 :78» 
With these notions, Hirose (1999) describes relations between the relevant 
constructions as follows: 
(8) khat-clause subject constructionllcausal because-clause constructiOl~ 
~ 1M-link 
linferential because-clause constructionl 
II-link ~ Is-link 
linference-denial because-clause constructiOl~ 
~B-X DM-Y constructio~  
(adapted from Hirose (1999:603» 
By describing inheritance relations between the constructions as in (8), Hirose 
claims that the JB-X DM-Y construction inherits its information multiply from the 
more general constructions, i.e. the inference-denial because-clause construction 
(e.g. (9b», where the because-clause is used adverbially, and the that-clausal 
subject construction (e.g. (9c», where the nominal that-clause occupies the subject 
position. 
(9) a. Just because John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy. 
b. Just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he is happy. 
c. That John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy. 
(Hirose (1991:25» 
The subject that-clause in (9c) describes the premise from which to draw a 
conclusion and its content is contextually presupposed. This is the same function 
as that of an inference-denial because-clause, and based on this functional similarity, 
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I-Iirose views the JB-X DM-Y construction, in which a because-clause appears in 
the subj ect position, as a special case of the that-clause subject construction. 
Hence, an instance link is posited between them. However, as I-Erose (199 I, 1999) 
observes, the that-clause subject construction may be an affirmative, as well as 
negative, sentence, whereas the JB-X DM-Y construction must be negative. Recall 
the contrast in (5b) repeated here as in (10): 
(10) {That/*(Just) because} John IS liked by all the students means 
that he is a good teacher. (= (5b)) 
According to Hirose, the fact that the JB-X DM-Y construction must be negative 
follows from the fact that the inference-denial because-clause construction, i.e. the 
other source of the inheritance, must be a negative sentence, as exemplified by the 
ill-formed sentence in (l0). That is, because the JB-X DM- Y construction has an 
inference-denial because-clause as its part, the former is always a negative sentence. 
I-ience, a subpart link is posited between the JB-X DM-Y and inference-denial 
because-clause constructions, and it is this subpart link that guarantees that the 
JB-X DM- Y construction must be a negative sentence. 
Hirose, in turn, relates the inference-denial because-clause construction with 
the inferential because-clause construction via subpart link. He argues that in the 
sense that the former denies an inferential relation, it contains the meaning of 
inference. Lastly, the inferential because-clause construction is considered as a 
metaphorical extension of the causal because-clause construction. That is, an 
inferential relation is construed as a metaphorical causal relation (see Hirose (1999) 
for details; cf also Sweetser (1990) and Kanetani (2007b )). I-Ience, a metaphorical 
extension link is posited between them. 
3.2 The inferential Because-Clause Construction as an irrelevant Construction 
As observed in the previous subsection, Hirose (1999) relates the 
inference-denial because-clause construction with the inferential because-clause 
construction (see (8)). Unlike Hirose's analysis, I claim here that the former 
should be related directly with the causal because-clause construction, not via the 
inferential because-clause construction, for the following reasons. First, like 
inference-denial because-clauses, which are typically focalized by just, causal 
because-clauses can also be focalized by juS't, while inferential ones cannot (cf. 
Kanetani (2007a)). Consider the following examples: 
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(11) a. He went to college just because his parents asked him to. 
(Schourup and Waida (1988:95» 
b. * It has rained, just because the ground is wet. 
(Kanetani (2007a:342» 
Sentence (11 a) is an instance of the causal because-clause construction with its 
because-clause modified by just, and the sentence is grammatical. Sentence (11 b), 
whose inferential because-clause is focalized by just, is not acceptable. I argued in 
Kanetani (2007a) that causal because-clauses, but not inferential ones, can be 
focalized by what Quirk et a1. (1985) call exclusives (e.g. just, simply, merely, etc.). 
In this relation, it is noteworthy that an inferential-denial because-clause may be 
modified by another exclusive such as simply or mere~y. It should also be noted 
that the adverb just used in the JB-X DM-Y construction (subsumed under the 
inference-denial because-clause construction) may be replaced with such adverbs 
without changing the meaning. Examples of simply and merely used in these 
constructions are given in (12a-d): 
(12) a. 
b. 
'" simply because a couple are gay, it doesn't mean that they'll 
not make good parents! 
(news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/talking~oint/406041.stm) 
Simply because one person is yelling "It's the shots," doesn 'f 
mean it works for EVERYONE on the spectrum. 
(edition.cnn.com/HEALTH/blogs/paging.dr.gupta/2008/03/myth 
s-of-autism.html) 
c. Well, merely because the number changed, it doesn't necessarily 
mean that a thing itself changed. (www.geneepstein.neti?p=98) 
d. And merely because you've done it well once doesn't mean you 
can do it well again. 
(www.guardian.co.uk/booksI2008/sep/20/robertharris.writing.fic 
tion) 
The focalizability of the because-clause by exclusives shows that the 
inference-denial because-clauses are more similar to causal because-clauses than to 
inferential because-clauses. 
Second, inference-denial because-clauses are inside the matrix negation. 
Hirose (1991) describes the meaning of sentence (13a) as (l3b): 
(13) a. Just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he is happy. 
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b. NEG [John is happy, because he is rich] 
(Hirose (1991 :25)) 
In (I 3 a), according to Hirose, the negative doesn't mean negates the inferential 
process of drawing the conclusion that he is not happy from the premise described 
in the because-clause. In this respect, the inference-denial because-clause 
construction is similar to the causal because-clause construction and different from 
the inferential because-clause construction. Like inference-denial ones, causal 
because-clauses may be inside the matrix negation, while inferential ones may not 
(cf. Rutherford (1970)). Observe the following contrast: 
(14) a. He doesn't beat his wi fe because he likes her. 
(Rutherford (1970: 100)) 
b. He's not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego. 
(Rutherford (1970:97)) 
Rutherford points out that sentence (14a) can be understood as either "it's because 
he likes his wife that he doesn't beat his wife (p.IOO)" where not in the matrix 
clause merely negates the proposition expressed in the main clause (i.e. narrow 
scope interpretation), or "it's not because he likes her that he beats his wife (p.l 00), 
where it negates the causal relation between what is mentioned in the main clause 
and what is mentioned in the because-clause (i.e. wide scope interpretation). In 
the inferential because-clause construction (I4b), by contrast, Rutherford observes 
that only narrow scope interpretation is possible, i.e., the only possible reading of 
sentence (l4b) is "it is because he just called from San Diego that I think he is not 
coming to class." Thus, we may say that the inference-denial because-clause 
construction is similar to the causal because-clause construction rather than to the 
inferential because-clause construction. 
Lastly, the inference-denial because-clauses may precede the main clause. 
This is also similar to causal because-clauses, and IS different from inferential 
because-clauses. Observe the following contrast: 
(15) a. Because it has rained, the ground is wet. 
b. * Because the ground is wet, it has rained. 
The because-clause in (15a) is a reason for the ground being wet, while that in (I5b) 
provides a premise from which to draw the conclusion that it must have rained. As 
the contrast shows, while causal because-clauses may precede the main clause, 
85 
inferential ones may not. This fact, agam, suggests the similarity of the 
inference-denial because-clause construction to the causal because-clause 
construction and its difference from the inferential because-clause construction. 
The three facts observed in this subsection, i.e. (i) the focalizability of the 
because-clause by an exclusive, (ii) the wide scope interpretation of the matrix 
negation, and (iii) the position of the because-clause, all suggest that the 
inference-denial because-clause construction should be related directly to the causal 
because-clause construction, not by way of the inferential because-clause 
construction. 
4. Revised Inheritance Model 
In the previous section, I reviewed Hirose's (1999) analysis and pointed out 
that the inference-denial because-clause construction should be related directly to 
the causal because-clause construction. That is, the inferential because-clause 
construction is not relevant in discussing the inference-denial because-clause 
construction and constructions that are subsequently related to it. More precisely, 
the inference-denial because-clause construction inherits no information from the 
inferential because-clause construction. 
I would like to start this section by considering what way the inference-denial 
because-clause construction is related to the causal because-clause construction. 
Since the inference-denial because-clause construction has both syntactic and 
semantic properties of the causal because-clause construction, it seems reasonable 
to see the former as an instance of the latter with its main clause substituted for a 
limited range of partially lexically filled expressions, e.g. if doesn't mean Y, it 
doesn't make Y, it is not Y. In other words, the inference-denial because-clause 
construction is a partially lexically filled instance of the causal because-clause 
construction. Hence, an instance link is posited between them, and this relation 
may be illustrated as follows: 
(16) causal: (Just) because ~j, .G2 
- \r 
inference-denial: Just because ~I' it doesn't mean Y 
In (16), the arrow represents a lexical substitution; the main clause of the causal 
because-clause construction C2 is substituted for the partially lexically filled 
expression it doesn't mean Y. In this way, the main clause of the inference-denial 
because-clause construction can be seen as a special case, or instance, of the main 
clause of the causal because-clause construction. 
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If the inference-denial because-clause construction is treated as an instance of 
the causal because-clause construction, a question may arise as to how the 
construction obtains the meaning of "inference" denial. s To give an answer to the 
question, let us consider a sentence like (17): 
(17) Because the ground is wet, I think it has rained. 
(Kanetani (2007b: 112)) 
We have seen in section 3.2 that an inferential because-clause cannot be in 
sentence-initial position, as shown in (18a) below. However, with an expression of 
the speaker's thought in the main clause such as J think, despite its sentence-initial 
because-clause, sentence (17) is accepted to some speakers as a sentence with 
virtually the same meaning as the meaning of sentence (I8b), i.e. an inferential 
process. Hence, the form-meaning mismatch. 
(18) a. * Because the ground is wet, it has rained. 
b. It has rained, because the ground is wet. 
(=(15b)) 
In Kanetani (2007b), I explain this mismatch phenomenon in accordance with the 
Override Principle provided in (19): 
(19) The Override Principle: If a lexical item IS semantically 
incompatible with its syntactic context, the meaning of the lexical 
item conforms to the meaning of the structure in which it is 
embedded. (Michaelis (2005:51)) 
Following the principle, the grammaticality of sentence (17) may be explained as 
follows. In (17), despite the inferential sense of 1 think, because of the syntactic 
context that it appears in, the whole sentence expresses a causal relation. That is, 
those who accept this sentence can recognize a causal relation between the ground 
being wet and the speaker concluding that it has rained. In other words, sentence 
(17) is accepted not as an irregular instance of the inferential because-clause 
construction, but as an instance of the causal because-clause construction. 
Therefore, even if the lexical expression 1 think in (17) seems to denote the 
5 As seen in section 3.1, Hirose (1999) treats the inference-denial because-clause 
construction as a subpart of the inferential because-clause construction (see (8)), and argues that 
the former contains the meaning of inference. He thus attributes the meaning of inference (to be 
denied) that the inference-denial because-clause construction has to the meaning of the inferential 
because-clause construction. 
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speaker's thought, such a semantic feature is overridden by the sentence form; the 
interpretation of the sentence is coerced into the causal one. 
Our view of the inference-denial because-clause construction as an instance 
of the causal because-clause construction is explained in the same way. The 
meaning of inference-denial can be conveyed by lexical expressions such as doesl1 '/ 
mean, while the whole sentence expresses a causal relation. Indeed, Bender and 
Kathol (2001) observe that the meaning of a sentence like Just because X doesl1 " 
mean Y is directly encoded by the lexical expression doesn't mean. 
In sum, the inference-denial because-clause construction is a special case of 
the causal because-clause construction whose main clause is substituted for a 
limited range of expressions that denote inference-denial. In order to maintain this 
idea, inheritance relations should be revised as follows: 
(20) khat-clause subject constructionllcausal because-clause constructionl 
lil-link 
linference-denial because-clause constructionl 
~B-X DM-Y constructio~  
Unlike Hirose's inheritance model in (8), the model proposed here does not include 
the inferential because-clause construction, since it is not relevant. In (20), the 
inference-denial because-clause and causal because-clause construction are 
connected directly, and an instance link is posited between them. 
5. The JBo-X DM-Y Construction as an Analogical Construction 
We are now at a point to consider how the JBo-X DM-Y construction, a 
syntactically anomalous construction, come into use. My claim is that the 
construction at issue is not a static construction but emerges on-line via analogies 
from the inference-denial because-clause and JB-X DM-Y constructions. The 
notion of analogy employed in this section is a four-part analogy, which may be 
formulated as follows: 
(21) A : B = C : D 
The formula provided in (21) reads, ~'A is to B as C is to D." Let us call the 
left-hand member of the formula the source, and the right-hand member the target. 
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Blevins and Blevins (2009:2) note, "[in an analogy like (21)], the relation R 
between a pair of items A:B provides a basis for identifYing an unknown item, given 
an item that matches A or B. Knowing R and knowing that C is similar to A 
permits one to identifY 0 as the counterpart of B." In this section, I will show that 
inference-denial uses of a because afphrase may be accounted for by this notion. 
Before examining the lBo-X DM-Y construction, let us consider a sentence 
like (22): 
(22) In my point of view the class sizes have been very large in many 
classes, but just because of that it doesn't mean the school can start 
kicking out students. 
(www.student-voices.org/SpeakOutDiscussion.aspx?Id=846) 
In this sentence, the main clause is introduced by it, which is bound by the because 
of phrase. Henceforth, I will call constructions of this kind the inference-denial 
because of construction. Constructions like (22), where a PP binds a pronoun, 
seems to violate Matsuyama's (2001) generalization that the binder and bindee must 
be identical in category features. 6 Nevertheless, the construction is used. 
In section 3.2, I compared causal because-clauses with inferential 
because-clauses in terms of (i) their focalizability by exclusives, (ii) their scope 
relations with matrix negation, and (iii) their positions. There is yet another 
diagnosis to distinguish causal because-clauses from inferential because-clauses. 
Causal ones may be replaced with a because afphrase, whereas inferential ones may 
not, as exemplified by the following contrast: 
(23) a. He's not coming to class because of his sickness. 
b. * He's not coming to class because of his having just called from 
San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 105)) 
If, as maintained in section 4, the inference-denial because-clause construction is an 
instance of the causal because-clause construction, one may expect it possible to 
replace an inference denial because-clause with a because of phrase. Here, an 
analogy like the following \\forks: What holds in the causal because-clause 
construction should also hold in the inference-denial because-clause construction. 
This may be illustrated as follows: 
(, Matsuyama (200 I) provides the generalization only for pro, but since if used in (24), an 
explicit counterpart of pro, is also nominal, this generalization should apply to the inference-denial 
because-clause construction, as well, \vhose main clause is introduced by the bound prOIlOlill it. 
(24) 
Just because X, it 
doesn'l mean Y 
I Because DINP, C, 
Just because ofX. 
it doesn " mean Y 
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In (24), the upper line represents the source of the analogy, the lower line its target, 
and the underlined part a product via the analogy. Here, the analogical deduction 
works as follows: If a causal because-clause is replaceable with a because of 
phrase, then an inference-denial because-clause should also be replaceable with a 
because of phrase. Thus, the knowledge of the similarity of the causal 
because-clause construction to the inference-denial because-clause construction 
permits the speaker to fill the gap (i.e. the underlined part in (24)) with the 
inference-denial because of construction as the counterpart of the causal because of 
construction. It is this analogy that makes the inference-denial because of 
construction, as in (22), acceptable, even though such a sentence does not meet 
syntactic conditions. 
Let us now turn to the JBo-X DM-Y construction, e.g. just because of Pele 
Wilson's dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in .Manhattan 
(= (1 )). Comparing the inference-denial because-clause construction with the 
JB-X DM- Y construction, we may find their difference either the presence or 
absence of the pronoun it. In this regard, Hirose (1991, 1999) points out that the 
two constructions are identical in their meanings, and Matsuyama (2001) considers 
the pronoun it used in the inference-denial because-clause construction an overt 
counterpart of the null subject pro (see section 2 for details of his pro analysis). 
From their observations, we may say that their difference is so subtle that another 
analogy as formulated in (25) is invoked: 7 
(25) 
Just because X, 
it doesn 'f mean Y 
Just because X 
doesn't mean Y 
Just because of X, 
it doesn't mean Y 
Just because of X 
doesn 'f mean Y 
7 Although it may be indisputable that their simi larity invokes analogies of this kind, closer 
investigations are necessary of exactly which aspect(s) in their similarity invoke(s) the analogy. 
Leaving it an open question for a future research, I do not discuss this issue farther in the present 
article, however. 
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This analogy makes one expect that what holds in the inference-denial 
because-clause construction should also hold in the JB-X DM-Y construction. As 
discussed above, an inference-denial because-clause could be replaced with a 
because of phrase, and so a subject because-clause is expected to be replaceable 
with a because of phrase as well. Notice that the source (i.e. the upper line) in (25) 
is identical with the target (i.e. the lower line) in (24). This means that once we 
obtain the inference-denial because C?f construction analogically, using the emergent 
construction as its source, the analogy as formulated in (25) works, and as a result, 
the JBo-X DM-Y construction emerges (as underlined in (25)). 
By combining the arguments in this section with the inheritance model 
proposed in section 4, the relations between the relevant constructions may thus be 
illustrated as follows: 
(26) khat-clause subject constructionllcausal because-clause constructio~ 
I,-link lII-link ~'" " 
inference-denial because-clause construction: 
, ~' (/iJ-~:~~~--~-~~:structiO~ Is-link ! 
, 
\ I I ---------------------------------------------~ ~' 
linference-denial because of constructionl " 
" 
" 
, ~\ 
~1'-·-B-o-_ X-D-M---Y-co-n-s-tr-u-c-tl-' o----'nl 
The dashed arrows represent analogies that work on the basis of the similarities 
between the constructions connected by the dashed lines. The similarity of the 
inference-denial because-clause construction to the casual because-clause 
construction invokes the analogy by which to produce the inference-denial because 
of construction. The analogically emergent construction, in turn, along with the 
analogy based on the similarity of the inference-denial because-clause construction 
to the JB-X DM-Y construction, produces the JBo-X DM-Y construction. Note 
that since inference-denial because of and JBo-X DM-Y constructions are not 
established as '"grammatical constructions," or not stored in OUf mind, inheritance 
links are not posited. Rather, such constructions should be considered to be 
produced on-line. This idea helps us account for the JBo-X DM-Y construction's 
unstable nature that we will briefly discuss in the following section. 
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6. Instability of the JBo-X DM-Y Construction 
As I noted in section 1, the JBo-X OM-Y construction is not perfectly 
admitted. In fact, some native speakers do not accept the sentences, and even after 
being shown attested examples, they \vould be doubtful about accepting the 
sentences. It is also true that as shown in this article, JBo-X OM-Y constructions 
do exist despite their anomalous syntactic nature. 
In this relation, Lambrecht (1988 :320) comments in his analysis of the there 
amalgam construction (e.g. there was a farmer had a dog) that such substandard 
sentences may be "uttered spontaneously" even if the speaker is ;'convinced that the 
constructions do not exist in his dialect or speech pattern." Likewise, the speaker 
may spontaneously utter the JBo-X OM-Y construction, even though (s)he may be 
aware that the construction is syntactically anomalous if time is given to reflect on 
its grammatical ity. This may in part account for the reason \vhy the construction is 
found particularly in informal registers. 
Presumably, facing a dilemma between syntactic rules or principles such as 
those reviewed in section 2 (cf. Matsuyama (200 I)), on one hand, and analogies 
such as those proposed in section 5, on the other, the speaker may feel uncertain 
whether a given sentence is acceptable or not. As a result, the JBo-X DM- Y 
construction is not entrenched as well as the JB-X OM-Y construction, and 
therefore is not a stable construction. 
7. Conclusion 
In this article, I showed how the JBo-X DM-Y construction, which is 
predicted to be ungrammatical, is used. Slightly modifying Hirose's (1999) 
inheritance model, I claimed that the construction at issue emerges on-line via 
analogies based primarily on the similarity of the causal because-clause 
construction to the inference-denial because-clause construction. By seeing the 
inference-denial because-clause construction as an instance of the causal 
because-clause construction, the analogy works that what holds in the latter should 
also hold in the fonner. Since a causal because-clause may be replaced by a 
because of phrase, one may expect that an inference-denial because-clause may be 
replaced with a because of phrase as \vell. This analogical deduction yields the 
inference-denial because of construction and the JBo-X OM construction. 
This conclusion leads to another argument that while the JB-X DM- Y 
construction is well entrenched (cf. Hilpert (2005), the JBo-X DM-Y construction 
is not. As I mentioned in section 5, the latter is a product of analogical deduction 
and therefore is not established as a "grammatical construction," or not stored in our 
mind. This straightforwardly accounts for the latter's substandard nature and 
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supports the usage-based model of grammar. Analogies do not only yield 
constructions that people may consider unacceptable but also account for the 
unstable nature of constructions that emerges in such ways. It is an advantage of 
construction grammar that we can take the notion of analogy naturally into the 
theory and account for a dilemma between the grammaticality and the actual use of 
a given expression. 
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